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Did the Exposure to Online Hate Increase After the November 2015 Paris Attacks? A 
Group Relations Approach 
Abstract 
This study analyzed the impact of the November 2015 Paris attacks on online hate. On the 
basis of social identity based theories of group relations, we hypothesized that exposure to 
online hate will increase in social climate of fear, uncertainty, and polarization. We expected 
that the increase of hate will be evident in the case of online hate associated to ethnicity or 
nationality, religion, political views, or terrorism, but not specifically other hate-associated 
categories. Societal level determinants of the temporal changes in online hate exposure have 
not been tested before. Our study utilized two cross-sectional, demographically balanced 
datasets to analyze the change in online hate exposure among Finnish young people aged 15 
to 30. The first sample was collected in May–June 2013 and the second one in December 
2015, only 1 month after the November 2015 Paris attacks. The results supported the 
hypotheses indicating that the quantity and quality of online hostilities are affected by the 
wider societal conditions. We suggest that more evidence of societal level determinants of 
online hostility is needed in order to understand online hate exposure rates at different times. 
Keywords: online hate, uncertainty–identity theory, social categories, social identity, 
groups, terrorism, immigration 
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Did the Exposure to Online Hate Increase After November 2015 Paris Attacks? A 
Group Relations Approach 
 
 Online hate (i.e., cyberhate, online hate speech, and other hate material) is a global 
phenomenon and may take many forms and target others based on their religion, race, 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, or some other group-defining 
characteristic (Banks, 2010; Hawdon, Oksanen, & Räsänen, 2016; Perry & Olsson, 2009). 
Notably, online hate is not an exception to the rules of interaction in the online setting but 
rather rooted in mainstream experience, and exposure to online hate has varied from 31 
percent to 67 percent in different samples across countries (Costello, Hawdon, Ratliff, & 
Grantham, 2016b; Hawdon et al., 2016; Oksanen, Hawdon, Holkeri, Näsi, & Räsänen, 2014).  
 The widely present hateful and xenophobic content online has raised concern in 
average online users but also in policymaking on a national and international level (Council 
of Europe, 2015; European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2016; Gagliardone, 
Gal, Alves, & Martinez, 2015). Hostile online behavior bears hurtful consequences to its 
victims (Keipi et al., 2017; Näsi et al., 2015; Tynes, 2006; Ybarra, Mitchell, Wolak, & 
Finkelhorn, 2006), but it can also be considered a threat to societal inclusiveness and a 
potential motivator for hateful acts offline (Awan & Zempi, 2016; Douglas, 2007; Waldron, 
2012). Especially in the times of social crises, such as terrorist attacks, online hate becomes 
an example of the increasing acts of violence and abuse faced by ethnic and religious 
minorities (Awan & Zempi, 2016). 
 When tackling online hate phenomena, we need wider empirical information on the 
prerequisites of online hostility. Earlier research has identified several correlates of violent 
online behavior on the levels of individual characteristics (e.g. low self-control, and high 
impulsivity, psychopathy or internalizing symptoms) and social interaction (e.g. anonymity, 
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low social control and group norms) (for review see e.g. Peterson & Densley, 2017). These 
correlates can explain why certain individuals and interactional contexts make hostile online 
behavior more probable. However, we lack empirical research on how wider societal (or 
macro) level phenomena can motivate changes in the quantity and quality of online hate over 
time and how this change is manifested in the viewership of such content.  
Witnessing tragic and unexpected societal events may explain why manifestations of 
anger and hate take new forms online. Previous studies have shown that online discussions 
escalate after dramatic events such as rampage shootings (Lindgren, 2011). These types of 
attacks may also act as trigger events and direct contents of online hate. Williams and Burnap 
(2016) have recently demonstrated how particularly racial and religious cyberhate in Twitter 
escalated after a murder by Islamic extremists in the United Kingdom. However, earlier 
studies have stressed relatively short time periods and specific discussion topics on certain 
social media platforms. Thus, there is a need for research-based knowledge about the 
dynamics of online hate during longer periods of time and the wider viewership-centered 
point of view. Only this would allow us to assess how frequent is the experience of being 
exposed to online hate among social media users and whether the probability of exposure 
changes over time. This study is also the first one to approach temporal change in online hate 
from the perspective of group relations. 
 In this paper, we analyze how social conditions marked by fear, polarization, and 
uncertainty are manifested in online hate exposure after the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. 
On November 13, 130 people in Paris were killed in attacks by the terrorist organization ISIS, 
and the assault caused major societal reactions throughout Europe. The atmosphere in Europe 
was already insecure at the time, as several strikes by international terrorist organizations had 
occurred around the world that year (Haugerud, 2016). One devastating example in the 
European context was the attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January, which 
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led to the death of 12 people. These attacks also motivated antagonistic reactions toward 
immigrants, and concerns were raised that refugees were potential terrorists despite the fact 
that many of them were escaping the terror caused by ISIS in the Middle East (Nail, 2016). 
Immigration was already a matter of growing societal debate throughout Europe due to the 
so-called “immigration crisis” caused by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, forcing over 1.2 
million people to seek out asylum in Europe, and the figures of incoming first-time asylum 
seekers peaked during September–November 2016 (EuroStat, 2016). 
 
Online Hate and Group relations 
 Our intergroup stance to online hate is based on the rich tradition of social 
psychological research explaining how prejudices are grounded on intergroup behavior 
(Allport, 1954; Brown, 2010; Tajfel, 1970). The starting point is grounded on previous 
empirical studies showing that online hate is typically targeted toward different social groups 
(Banks, 2010; Gagliardone et al., 2015; Hawdon et al., 2016; Perry & Olsson, 2009). Since 
the early days of domestic Internet, there have been both formal and informal hate groups 
disseminating hateful speech or ideology online. They have a wide variety of targets and 
ideological views, ranging from terrorist organizations to gangs of various types (Gerstenfeld, 
2013, pp. 130–131).  
Currently, different affordances of social media make it possible for people to group 
up with likeminded individuals without spatial restrictions and then disseminate their 
thoughts. Thus, social media can provide a social context of opinion congruence and 
empowerment in which people are more willing to express thoughts and ideologies that might 
be rejected elsewhere (Chun & Lee, 2017; Lee & Chun, 2015). This makes social media a 
particularly suitable platform for disseminating hateful or “fringe” opinions and ideologies 
(Barkun, 2017). In addition, the socio-technological environment of online interaction that 
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enhances the group identifications and the intragroup processes of online groups can 
legitimate and amplify extreme attitudes (Douglas, 2007; McGarty, Lala, & Douglas, 2011; 
Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & De Groot, 2001; Spears, Postmes, Lea, & Wolbert, 2002). It is 
perhaps not a surprise that hate is often disseminated through those channels that make group 
formation and engagement very easy and that facilitate the clash between different 
ideological views (Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012; Hutchens, Cicchirillo, & Hmielowski, 2015).  
 Our theoretical framework of group relations is based on work done on social identity 
theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, 1985; 
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). First, SIT suggests that individual 
identity is based on social categorization and comparison between different categories (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). People conceive themselves as members of certain groups (the in-groups) 
and as non-members in others (the out-groups) that strive to maintain positive social identity 
by favorable comparison between those groups. This search for self-enhancement leads to so-
called intergroup bias in which the in-group is favored over the out-groups. The activation of 
intergroup bias is dependent on the level of individuals’ identification with the in-group, the 
relevance of the comparison between the groups in a given social situation, and the relevance 
of the out-group as a reference point (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Second, according to SCT (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), an integral part of the 
social identity approach, identifying oneself as a representative of a certain category also 
leads to depersonalization (i.e. a tendency to conceive the self in terms of group identity 
instead of personal identity). As a consequence, one strongly identifies with the stereotypical 
conception of an in-group member and with the group attributes and norms (Brown, 2010; 
Marqués, Abrams, Paez, & Hogg, 2001; Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987).  
In social reality, favoring one’s in-group over perceived out-groups ranges from 
“mere categorical exaggerations” to extreme forms of out-group hostility (Billing, 2002, 
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178). Thus, a proper understanding of societal circumstances can help us to explain why and 
when biased perceptions of out-group members are likely to escalate. When societal 
conditions threaten the satisfaction of basic human needs, such as the need for security and 
control over one’s own life, those out-groups perceived as responsible for the unsatisfactory 
circumstances are often targeted by increasing hostilities (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003). Indeed, 
there is plenty of historical evidence showing how different group conflicts arise in times of 
fear, economic hardship, social and political segregation, and perceived in-group threats (see, 
e.g., Baumeister, 1997; Staub, 1989; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003). 
According to the terror management theory (TMT) (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 1986), anxiety caused by the awareness of one’s own vulnerability and death 
functions as a motivator to increase intergroup bias. In other words, people will seek to buffer 
the terror of mortality salience by more strongly identifying with worldviews shared within 
one’s in-group. In addition, people are more likely to discriminate against out-groups that 
threaten, or do not validate, their anxiety-buffer (the in-group cultural worldview) 
(Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon 1990). TMT has gained support from several 
studies reporting that mortality salience is related to out-group discrimination and support for 
extreme and violent attitudes (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Das, Bushman, Bezemer, 
Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Greenberg et al., 1990). 
The theory of uncertainty-identity (UIT) (Hogg, 2007, 2014; Hogg et al., 2013) 
predicts that, at times of social uncertainty, individuals perceive the safety or manageability 
of their everyday life as endangered and, thus, tend to categorize the social reality according 
to more rigidly and exclusionary defined groups for overcoming the experienced uncertainty. 
As a consequence, the intra-group bias becomes inflated, leading to the adoption of more 
radical attitudes toward out-group members. A series of research has shown that, as a 
consequence of uncertainty, individuals tend to identify more with clearly distinctive groups 
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and approve more extreme ideologies and behaviors (Doosje, Lose man, & van den Bos, 
2013; Esses, Stelian Medianu, & Lawson, 2013; Federico, Hunt, & Fisher, 2013; Grant & 
Hogg, 2012; Hogg, 2010; Hogg & Adelman, 2013).  
In addition to mortality salience (TMT) and uncertainty (UIT), perceived threats from 
out-groups on physical well-being and power (realistic threat) or values and beliefs  
(symbolic threat) of the in-group tend to motivate out-group discrimination (Stephan, Ybarra, 
& Rios Morrison, 2009; Stephan & Renfro, 2002). In addition to realistic and symbolic 
threats, the intergroup threat theory (ITT) has been complemented with elements of group 
esteem threats, being personally threatened in intergroup interactions and having negative 
expectations concerning the out-group, for example (Brown, 2010; Koomen, W. & Van der 
Pligt, 2016; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Indeed, perceived group threats have been reported to 
predict out-group discrimination in various studies (Kauff et al., 2015; Riek, Mania, & 
Gaertner, 2006; Wirtz, van der Pligt & Doosje, 2016).  
Our theoretical framework suggests that societal events and conditions can shape the 
quantity and quality of online hate. Firstly, out-group hostilities will increase at times of fear, 
uncertainty and perceived threats. Secondly, people will witness more hostile messages in 
online space, as the social media provides an accessible forum for expressing and spreading 
hateful thoughts without the restrictions present in offline social networks and other media 
(Barkun, 2017). Finally, instead off all possible social categories, online hate is targeting 
categories perceived as relating to unsatisfactory conditions (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003). The 
tendency of societal crises to escalate hateful reactions toward certain social categories in 
social media has already been demonstrated in the studies of online hate as well (see Awan & 
Zempi, 2016; Williams & Burnap, 2016). 
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Immigration Crisis and Social Uncertainty in Finland 
 Finland is a Nordic country with 5.5 million habitants and a relatively low ethnic 
diversity (United Nations, 2013). Finland, like other Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, and Iceland), has been characterized by a strong welfare tradition that includes free 
education and healthcare and extensive income distribution (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
Finland, like the rest of the world, was hit by the economic recession in 2007–2008, and the 
economy has been flat ever since. Economic problems have also concerned average citizens 
who have faced record figures of payment default (Oksanen, Aaltonen, & Rantala, 2015). 
 The so-called “immigration crisis” in Europe, caused by the conflicts in Syria and 
Iraq, started during the time when people already felt uncertain about the future due to the 
stagnating economy. During 2015, Finland received over five times as many asylum seekers 
as in the previous year, and the total amount of immigrants rose over 32,000. The peak of the 
crisis was during the autumn period, and different immigration centers were opened 
throughout the country. Clearly, the biggest group of immigrants came from Iraq (20,485), 
followed by Afganistan (5,214), Somalia (1,981), and Syria (877).  
 The theme of immigration was a matter of heated debate in Finnish society 
(Silvennoinen, 2016). One example was the Rajat Kiinni (close the borders) Facebook group, 
which organized anti-immigration events starting from September 2015. Many of these anti-
immigration events often targeted Islam as well. Along with anti-immigration events, the 
year 2015 in Finland witnessed a 50 percent increase in hate crimes and the rise of right-wing 
extremism and street patrol groups such as Soldiers of Odin that were organized via 
Facebook (Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2016a). Accused of sexual harassment and rape 
cases, immigrants were also widely discussed in both traditional media and social media 
(Silvennoinen, 2016). Also, scandalous “fake media” online journals, such as MV-lehti, 
started to gain massive popularity.  
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The economic recession has also been visible in the Finnish societal immigration 
discourse (Keskinen, 2016). Traditionally, the Finnish national identity has been based on the 
Nordic egalitarian welfare model, but this policy has faced increasing pressure at the times of 
recession and growing demands for economic austerity in Finland. In some public opinions 
immigrants have been seen as a threat to the welfare state and some have requested more 
nationalistic and exclusive welfare policies that would deny the welfare benefits from the 
immigrants. 
 In social media, Finns were divided between those opposing immigration and those 
taking a more liberal stance. This is the result of a longer continuum in which the changing 
mediascape and new media technology have allowed for the formation of anti-immigration 
online communities (e.g., Hommaforum) and their social and political mobilization (Horsti, 
2015). The escalated division between groups with anti-immigration stances and more 
tolerant ideologies has created an ongoing debate that is salient in Finnish online forums but 
also in mainstream media. The mainstream media was also often criticized for letting the 
anti-immigration movement set the agenda for public discussion and, of course, for staying 
silent about immigration-related topics by the anti-immigration movement (Horsti, 2015).  
 The year 2015 can be regarded as the year that tinged social confrontation and 
culminated in the Paris tragedy of November 13. The victims and the proximal consequences 
of the assault were located in Paris and France, but the media-based contact extended its 
psychosocial impact throughout Europe and the rest of the world. This phenomenon of 
“secondhand terrorism” (see Comer & Kendal, 2007) is manifested in extended uncertainty 
(i.e., a social climate that is determined by continuous insecurity and fear of future attacks 
based on possibilities instead of probabilities). This effect of extended uncertainty can be 
even stronger in countries with infrequent terrorist assaults such as Finland (Comer, Bry, 
Poznanski, & Golik, 2016). The social climate of fear is perhaps mirrored in the fact that the 
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fear of becoming a victim of violent or sexual assault among Finnish increased in 2015, a  
trend that had been decreasing in recent years (Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2016b; 
Danielsson & Kääriäinen, 2016). This stressor has emerged despite crime occurrence not 
having changed during the given years.  
 Here, we treat the case of Finland as a context for a natural experiment analyzing the 
temporal change in online hate in times of social insecurity and uncertainty. As described 
before, the social climate in Finland, modified by economic recession, the peaking numbers 
of asylum seekers, and ideological and political divides, was already strained before the 
tragic events in Paris and its psychosocial impact. We believe that the increased salience of 
perceived safety and other threats along with social uncertainty is manifested in social 
identification and group discrimination processes as predicted by social psychological 
theories of group relations, TMT (Greenberg et al., 1986), UIT (Hogg, 2007, 2014) and ITT 
(Stephan et al., 2009).  
 
Research Hypotheses 
 In this study, we analyze the temporal change in online hate phenomenon by utilizing 
two datasets collected in 2013 and 2015. Our presumption is that the quantity and quality of 
online hate is being shaped by the societal conditions. To test this presumption, we have 
formulated a total of three research hypotheses based on our theoretical framework: 
 First, we hypothesize that as a consequence of unsafety and uncertainty causing 
events in 2015, people will witness more hostility expressed in online spaces; thus, our 
survey respondents will report more exposure to hateful material online in 2015 when 
compared to 2013 (H1). Second, we hypothesize that people will report more exposure to 
hate associated with categories relating to social uncertainty and perceived in-group threats 
(ethnicity or nationality, religion, political views, and terrorism; H2). The third hypothesis is 
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that no similar effect will be found in terms of less relevant categories (gender, sexual 
orientation, disability, and appearance; H3).  
The hypotheses are based on previous studies indicating the association between 
unsatisfactory societal conditions and intergroup hostilities (Hogg, 2007; Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 
2009) and triggering societal events and hateful messaging in social media (Williams & 
Burnap, 2016). 
Method 
Participants 
 The first dataset was collected in May–June 2013 from Finland. The participants (n = 
555) were aged 15 to 30 (Mean = 22.59, SD = 4.21), and half of them (50.0%) were female. 
The respondents were recruited from a panel of volunteer respondents administrated by 
Survey Sample International (SSI) and the sample was stratified to mirror the Finnish 
population aged 15 to 30 on a number of different socio-demographic factors, including age, 
gender, and living region.  
 The second dataset was collected in the beginning of December 10–15, 2015 
approximately 1 month after the Paris attacks. Those respondents who were aged 16 to 30 
were selected for this study (n=192, mean age = 23.13, SD = 3.78, 57.73% female). The data 
collection and respondent recruitment was administrated by the TNS Finland, and the sample 
was stratified to mirror the Finnish population in terms of age, gender, and living region. The 
used quotas allowed small differences to official population statistics. 
Measures 
 Dependent variables. Online hate exposure was measured by asking participants 
whether they had seen (in the last 3 months) online material that threatened or degraded 
individual or social groups (“no” answers were coded as 0 and “yes” answers were coded as 
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1). Those participants who had seen online hate content were then presented with a follow-up 
question concerning the characteristics that the hateful material had related to. Options 
included ethnicity or nationality, religious conviction, political views, sexual orientation, 
gender, disability, appearance, and terrorism. This measure of online hate and its subtypes 
has been utilized in earlier research (Costello, Hawdon, & Ratliff, 2016a; Costello et al., 
2016b; Hawdon et al., 2016; Oksanen et al., 2014). The exposure to these hate content types 
was measured with dummy variables (0 indicating no exposure and 1 indicating at least one 
exposure experience).  
 Treatment variable. Our treatment variable indicated whether the observation was 
made after the Paris attacks. The value of this variable was 0 for those respondents who had 
answered the survey before the attacks (the dataset collected in 2013) and 1 for respondents 
included in the dataset collected at the end of 2015. 
 Covariates. Our covariates (i.e, age, gender, education, living arrangements, and the 
activity of Internet use) were chosen on the basis of earlier studies concerning the 
associations between online hate exposure and sociodemographic characteristics and online 
activity (Costello et al., 2016b; Hawdon et al., 2016; Räsänen et al., 2016). Education was 
measured by including two dummy variables indicating whether the participant had 
completed secondary level education or higher level education (the reference category being 
basic level education). The variable measuring living arrangements indicated whether the 
participant was living with his or her parents. The activity of Internet use was measured with 
a dummy variable indicating whether the participant used the Internet more than once a day. 
Analytic Strategy 
 Making inferences about the effect of certain interventions or events (i.e., treatment) 
on the basis of observational data is not unproblematic. The problems are often 
conceptualized as selection bias (see, e.g., Rickles, 2016), as the treated group (exposed to an 
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intervention or event) and the group it is being compared to (control group) may differ in 
terms of pre-treatment characteristics. This means that the observed outcomes for these 
groups cannot be attributed to the treatment, as they may as well be caused by other 
differences between them. Thus, causal relationships are often being studied by randomized 
experiments in which the comparability of treated and control groups is ensured by randomly 
placing individuals in those groups (Stuart, 2010). However, the randomized experiment 
design is not always accessible in the field of social sciences, and this is perhaps most 
prominent when examining events such as terrorist attacks. In these cases, there are analytical 
strategies for observational studies to replicate some characteristics of randomized 
experiment design (Stuart, 2010).  
 To account for possible selection bias, due to sociodemographic characteristics and 
online use activity, we used an analytical combination of the statistical technique of nearest-
neighbor matching (see Rubin, 1973; Stuart, 2010) and logistic regression analysis in 
estimating the effect of the Paris attacks on hateful online content. With nearest-neighbor 
matching, we created two comparative sets of participants from the 2013 dataset (control 
group prior to the assault) and the 2015 dataset (the treated group). In the process, every 
respondent in the treatment group was given a closest matching counterpart from the control 
group. The selection of control group respondents was based on the propensity score, which 
is a measure of distance between the observations based on the likelihood of belonging to the 
treatment group. The likelihood is based on a logistic model using the selected covariates as 
predictors and the membership in the treated group as an outcome variable.  
 In our nearest-neighbor matching process, we used age, gender, education, living 
arrangements, and the activity of Internet use as covariates. As can be seen from Table 1, our 
covariate balance improved significantly as a consequence of the matching procedure. In the 
case of unmatched datasets, there are statistically significant differences in distributions of 
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gender, education, and online activity. In the 2015 data, there are more females, highly 
educated individuals, and active online users than there were in the data collected in 2013. 
The participants in the 2015 data, on average, are also older, and there are more of those who 
have completed a secondary degree education and are living with their parents, even though 
these estimates are not quite significant (with p-values of 0.071, 0.061, and 0.081, 
respectively). After the matching process, all differences in covariate distribution are 
statistically insignificant. In the matching process, six respondents from the treated group 
(originally 194) were discarded due to missing observations relating to samples of 188 
participants.  
 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
 In step two, we first combined the matched samples in one aggregated dataset. Then 
we estimated the effect of the Paris attacks (the treatment variable) as a change in the 
probability of online hate exposure by running a logistic regression model with the covariates 
also utilized in the propensity score estimation. When representing the results of this 
predictive analysis, we report the average marginal effects, standard errors, z-values, and p-
values. This two-step model combining the matching process and regression analysis is a 
recommended way to reduce selection bias, and it has been used on earlier studies as well 
(see Klement, 2016; Rubin & Thomas, 2000). 
Results 
 There was a substantive increase of online hate exposure among young Finnish 
people between 2013 and 2015. Approximately 47 percent of respondents had encountered 
online hate during 2013, while the proportion was 74 percent at the end of 2015. Table 2 also 
shows changes in the contents of online hate. In 2013, the most common form of online hate 
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concerned ethnicity or nationality (59.9%), followed by sexual orientation (57%) and 
appearance (42%). When measured after the Paris attacks, the hate was most frequently 
related to ethnicity or nationality (81%), religious conviction (71%), terrorism (66%), and 
political views (47%). For predictive analysis of the probability of online hate exposure after 
the Paris attacks, see Table 3. 
 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
 
 According to our logistic regression analysis, there was a significant increase in the 
probability of exposure to online hate in general as well as to hate relating to categories of 
terrorism, religious conviction, ethnicity or nationality, political views, and gender. The 
probability of exposure to online hate in general was 27 percent higher after the Paris attacks. 
In the case of different subtypes of online hate, the effect was strongest for the probability of 
exposure to terrorism-related hate, which increased 42 percent. The probability of exposure 
to online hate relating to religious conviction was 34 percent higher at the end of 2015, while 
the probability increased 28 percent for ethnicity- or nationality-related hate and 19 percent 
for hate concerning political views. There was also a significant increase of 8 percent in the 
probability of exposure to hate related to gender categories. The effect estimates for hate 
targeting social categories of disability, sexual orientation, and appearance were not 
statistically significant.  
 
<<Table 3 about here>> 
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Discussion 
 In this article, we analyzed how the exposure to online hate had changed in quantity 
and quality as a consequence of public uncertainty after the Paris attacks preceded by 
prolonged economic recession and escalated immigration debate. The measurement of online 
hate was done over the time period of 2013 and 2015, just a month after the Paris attacks. 
Our theoretical presumption was that out-group hostilities will increase at times of fear, 
uncertainty and perceived threat (Hogg, 2007; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; 
Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2009) and, therefore, people will encounter more hate 
content in online space. In addition, we presumed that both the quantity and quality of online 
hate will change as hostilities will be targeted towards social categories perceived as related 
to fear, uncertainty and threats (Awan & Zempi, 2016; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003; Williams & 
Burnap, 2016).  
 Analysis confirmed that encountering hate content online was more frequent after the 
Paris attacks, as young people were 27 percent more likely to be exposed to online hate at the 
end of 2015 than they were in the 2013 sample. The finding is in line with earlier research 
showing that, as a consequence of tragic societal events, hateful messaging will increase in 
social media (Awan & Zempi, 2016; Williams & Burnap, 2016). When interpreted through 
our theoretical framework of social psychological theories of group relations (Greenberg et 
al., 1986; Hogg, 2007, 2014; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), this result shows how times of 
insecurity and uncertainty tend to inflate the intergroup bias of favoring in-group members 
over the out-group members. As a result, people are more willing to adopt critical and even 
extreme stances and behavior toward out-groups. In online spaces, this is manifested in 
increased probability to encounter hostilities expressed toward social groups. It is also likely 
that individuals with hateful opinions perceive increasing presence in online hate content as 
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empowering which, in turn, further lowers the threshold of expressing one’s own hostile 
thoughts (Barkun, 2017; Chun & Lee, 2017). 
 In addition, we expected that people would witness more hostility associated with 
social categories relating to the Paris attacks, as well as the political and ethnic divides 
preceding them (e.g ethnicity or nationality, religious conviction, political views, terrorism). 
We also expected that no similar effect would be found in the case of categories not related to 
the social climate of extended uncertainty (e.g. gender, sexual orientation, disability and 
appearance).  
Our analysis confirmed that young people encountered more online hate in categories 
related to a social climate of fear and uncertainty, but there was no similar effect in the case 
of nonrelated categories. According to our theoretical framework, the activation of intergroup 
bias is dependent on the relevance of the intergroup comparison and the out-group as a 
reference point, in addition to individuals’ identification with the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). Here, categories of ethnicity or nationality, religious conviction, political views and 
terrorism have become more accessible references for comparison and conceptualization of 
social reality. Increased hostilities toward individuals and social groups perceived to share 
some features with perpetrators of criminal public events has also been reported in earlier 
research (Awan & Zempi, 2016; Williams & Burnap, 2016), even though there is obviously 
is no actual connection between them.  
Limitations 
 In our analyses, the problems relating to causal interference using observational data 
were taken into account by using a two-step analytical strategy in which a nearest-neighbor 
matching, based on estimated propensity scores, was first performed to enhance the 
comparability between two datasets (or the treatment and control groups). Then a logistic 
regression was conducted with the matched dataset for estimating the change in online hate 
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exposure after the Paris attacks. Even though this analytical strategy is a recommended way 
of assessing causal effects with observational data (Rubin & Thomas, 2000), the 
hypothesized causal relationship between the Paris attacks and the increase in online hate 
cannot be unquestionably confirmed by using cross-sectional data.  
 Another possible limitation of the present study is the subjective and category theme-
based measurement of the online hate. This approach has, however, also been utilized 
elsewhere (Costello et al., 2016a; Costello et al., 2016b; Hawdon et al., 2016; Oksanen et al., 
2014). For example, as we assessed how the self-reported exposure to hateful material online 
had changed between the two chosen time points, the increase in hate content exposure could 
be, at least partly, explained by some individuals becoming more sensitive to recognizing 
hostile online content.  
 On the basis of the category theme-based measurement, in turn, we cannot tell which 
specific groups were targeted by the encountered hostilities. However, we decided to utilize 
the category theme-based approach instead of the specific group-based one in order to 
analyze which social divides had escalated in social media. As there is a multitude of possible 
grouping criteria for political views, for example, our focus here was not to examine which 
ideological groups were those targeted by online hate but to analyze whether the political 
views were used as a social discrimination criterion in the first palace. Of course, there is a 
long and highly important tradition of social psychological research examining xenophobic 
attitudes and prejudiced thinking toward specific social groups (see, e.g., Brown, 2010) as 
well as studies analyzing how certain groups are being exposed to online hate (for hate 
expressed toward the Muslim population, see, e.g., Awan & Zempi, 2016; Williams & 
Burnap, 2016). We believe there is a need for research-based knowledge on online hate 
generated by both approaches.  
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Conclusions 
 The hateful online content is apparent in social media interactions (Costello et al., 
2016a; Hawdon et al., 2016; Oksanen et al., 2014). As the online hate is damaging for both 
individual victims (Keipi et al., 2017; Näsi et al., 2015; Tynes, 2006; Ybarra, Mitchell, 
Wolak, & Finkelhorn, 2006) and societies as collectives (Awan & Zempi, 2016; Waldron, 
2012), it has become a target of national and international policy making and interventions 
(Council of Europe, 2015; European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, 2016; 
Gagliardone et al, 2015). However, more research based knowledge is needed on why hostile 
online behavior emerges and how it changes over time. Individual and interaction level 
explanations (see Peterson & Densley, 2017) can reveal why some individuals and social 
contexts are more prone to online hostility. However, these explanations do not cover the fact 
that hate content spreading in social media appear to mainly attack certain social categories 
and this selectivity is shaped by temporal societal conditions. Thus, future research and 
policy interventions tackling the consequences of hostile online behaviour should stress how 
societal conditions always contribute to present and future forms of online hate. 
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Table 1. The balance of selected covariates between 2013 and 2015 samples with mean values, standard deviations and p-values of the t-test 
 
Un-matched samples 
     
  
2013 2015 t-test 
  
mean sd mean sd p-value 
Age 22.59 4.21 23.18 3.76 0.071 
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.041 
Education  
      
 
Secondary (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.061 
 
Higher (0 = no, 1 = yes 0.17 0.37 0.28 0.45 0.003 
Living with parents (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.32 0.47 0.25 0.43 0.081 
Active online user (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.73 0.44 0.92 0.28 0.000 
n 
 
555 
 
188 
  
       Matched samples 
     
  
2013 2015 t-test 
  
mean sd mean sd p-value 
Age 23.44 3.80 23.18 3.76 0.504 
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.61 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.600 
Education 
      
 
Second level (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.50 1.000 
 
Higher education (0 = no, 1 = yes 0.29 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.819 
Living with parents (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.811 
Active online user (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.90 0.30 0.92 0.28 0.720 
n 
 
188 
 
188   
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Table 2. Exposure to online hate in general and by different hate categories (frequencies and percentages) 
 
 
2013 2015 
 
n % n % 
Seen online hate 88 46.8 139 73.9 
 
Categories related to uncertainty 
 Ethnicity or nationality 58 56.9 112 80.6 
Religious conviction 33 37.5 98 70.5 
Political views 29 33.0 65 46.8 
Terrorism 12 13.6 92 66.2 
 
Categories not related to uncertainty 
  Sexual orientation 58 56.9 45 32.4 
Appearance 37 42.0 35 25.2 
Gender 22 25.5 37 26.6 
Disability 14 15.9 16 11.5 
n 188 188 
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Table 3. Average partial effects (APEs) of Paris attacks on online hate in general and on different hate categories 
 
  
APE SE z-score p-value 
Seen online hate 0.268 0.047 5.649 0.000 
 
Categories related to uncertainty 
    Ethnicity or nationality 0.282 0.048 5.866 0.000 
Religious conviction 0.341 0.044 7.683 0.000 
Political views 0.191 0.043 4.404 0.000 
Terrorism 0.422 0.039 10.738 0.000 
 
Categories not related to uncertainty 
    Sexual orientation -0.073 0.046 -1.607 0.108 
Appearance -0.013 0.040 -0.341 0.733 
Gender 0.075 0.037 2.042 0.041 
Disability 0.008 0.028 0.280 0.780 
 
 
 
 
 
 
